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Abstract
Background: A key challenge for modelling infectious disease dynamics is to understand the
spatial spread of infection in real landscapes. This ideally requires a parallel record of spatial
epidemic spread and a detailed map of susceptible host density along with relevant transport links
and geographical features.
Results: Here we analyse the most detailed such data to date arising from the UK 2001 foot and
mouth epidemic. We show that Euclidean distance between infectious and susceptible premises is
a better predictor of transmission risk than shortest and quickest routes via road, except where
major geographical features intervene.
Conclusion: Thus, a simple spatial transmission kernel based on Euclidean distance suffices in
most regions, probably reflecting the multiplicity of transmission routes during the epidemic.
Background
The UK 2001 epidemic of foot and mouth disease high-
lighted the need for national governments to have well
thought out and workable contingency plans to control
the spread of highly infectious animal diseases. These
plans must be based on quantitative predictions of epi-
demic size and extent under various conditions which, in
turn, must be based on an understanding of how disease
spreads between livestock premises. For a disease like foot
and mouth that has a multitude of transmission routes
between premises, predicting the course of an epidemic is
complicated by demographic and topographic heteroge-
neity. The UK 2001 foot and mouth epidemic has fur-
nished us with unique data on the temporal and spatial
spread of this disease. This, coupled with demographic
data of livestock holdings within the UK, gives us the
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opportunity to study in detail the various risk factors asso-
ciated with disease spread. In this paper we focus on the
effect caused by geographical features within the UK land-
scape.
Foot and mouth disease is a viral infection of mainly
domesticated and wild cloven-hoofed animals. It is an
acute, febrile disease typically associated with lesions on
the feet and in the mouth [1]. There are seven serotypes of
foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV) which may differ in
their transmission characteristics [2]. The introduction of
type O FMDV into the UK in early 2001 resulted in
reported infection in livestock on 2,026 mainland
premises. 4.2 million animals on over 10,000 premises
were slaughtered in the ensuing operation to wipe out the
disease [2]. Before the nationwide movement ban on 23rd
February 2001, the disease was seeded across the UK by
the transportation of infected sheep. After the ban, disease
spread became more highly localised – about 50% of
infections occurred within 3 km of an infectious infected
premises (IP), and about 80% occurred within 10 km [3-
5]. Early models of the epidemic quantified the risk of
transmission using a simple concept called a transmission
kernel [6]. The kernel encapsulated multiple and diverse
transmission routes in a simple function of Euclidean dis-
tance between infectious and susceptible farms. An esti-
mate of the kernel, based on the UK Government's
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) contact tracing data, is shown as the black line in
Fig. 1[3,5].
Using Euclidean distance between farms in the transmis-
sion kernel was a first approximation to quantify the effect
of spatial separation on FMDV transmission. However,
contact tracing of infection by DEFRA highlighted several
important transmission routes that occurred via road after
the movement ban. These included movement of vehi-
cles, personnel, milk tankers, farm equipment and live-
stock [7]. Thus, road-based measures may be better
predictors of transmission risk than just simple Euclidean
distance, especially in areas where roads go around large
geographical features such as hills, rivers and estuaries.
Showing this, however, is complicated by the non-unique,
non-linear relationships between Euclidean distance and
road-based measures, and by the fact that Euclidean dis-
tance is already a risk factor. Nevertheless, with detailed
descriptions of the UK road network and the UK 2001
foot and mouth disease dynamics, we have developed a
statistical test that can detect risk associated with road-
based measures. In this paper we consider shortest and
quickest routes.
Briefly, the test looks for a significant difference in the
mean shortest or quickest route between farms where a
possible transmission occurred and the mean shortest or
quickest route between farms where no transmission
occurred; the rational being that if shortest or quickest
routes are risk factors, farms closer to an IP by road are
more likely to have been infected than farms farther away.
A detailed description of the test is given in Methods
Results and discussion
We analyse the regional epidemics in Devon, Cumbria,
Dumfries and Galloway, Settle and the Welsh borders.
Counties included in the analyses are given in Table 1.
Shortest route versus Euclidean distance for the epidemic
in Devon for all possible transmission events after 23rd
February and within 10 km are shown as open black cir-
cles in Fig. 2. All non-transmissions in Devon after 23rd
February and within 10 km are shown as yellow closed-
circles.
The p-value for the null hypothesis that the difference in
the mean shortest route between possible transmissions
and the mean shortest route between non-transmissions
could have arisen by chance is 0.55 (Table 2). Therefore
we conclude that shortest route in Devon is no better a
predictor of risk than Euclidean distance. Quickest route is
similarly no better: p = 0.91. These conclusions are robust
to assumptions about latent period and species transmis-
sibilities (Table 2). Similar conclusions can be drawn for
the other epidemics in the Welsh borders, Cumbria, Settle
and Dumfries and Galloway. When the analysis is done
with only those 65% of IPs that were positively confirmed
Euclidean-distance based kernel (black line) estimated from  DEFRA contact tracing after 23rd February 2001 Figure 1
Euclidean-distance based kernel (black line) estimated from 
DEFRA contact tracing after 23rd February 2001. Shortest 
route (magenta line) and quickest route (green line) kernels 
estimated from the Euclidean-distance based kernel and the 
Devon demographic data.BMC Veterinary Research 2006, 2:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/2/3
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as infected by the Institute of Animal Health at Pirbright,
our conclusions remain unchanged (see Table 3).
These tests show that shortest and quickest routes are no
better predictors of transmission risk than Euclidean dis-
tance. However, it does not prove that they are any worse.
In order to test this we turn the analysis around and ask if
Euclidean distance is a better predictor of transmission
risk than shortest or quickest route. This requires the cal-
culation of shortest and quickest route transmission ker-
nels (see Methods and Fig. 1). The p-values for the null-
hypothesis that the difference in the mean Euclidean dis-
tance between possible transmissions and the mean Eucli-
dean distance between non-transmissions could have
arisen by chance are given in Table 2. For all regions and
all parameter values the p-values are significant, strongly
suggesting that Euclidean distance is a better predictor of
risk than shortest and quickest routes. When the analysis
is done with only those IPs that were positively confirmed
as infected the results are not significant for shortest route
in Devon, Dumfries and Galloway and the Welsh Borders,
and for quickest route in the Welsh Borders. This is most
likely due to small sample sizes reducing the power of the
test (see n in Table 3).
The above statistical test acts on the regional scale, there-
fore, distance-based risk associated with specific geo-
graphical features is lost when we analyse over a region
with widely variable topography. Of particular interest are
geographical features that act as barriers to direct FMDV
transmission between farms. Such features include lakes,
rivers, estuaries, hills, mountains, railway lines and major
arterial roads. A key question is whether transmission
across such features is better modelled using Euclidean-
distance or some other distance measure; road-based
measures being the most obvious candidates because the
road network is shaped by such geographical features:
roads go around lakes; are diverted, sometimes by long
distances, by rivers, estuaries, railway lines and motor-
ways; and tend to follow valleys rather than climb hills
and mountains. This is demonstrated in Fig. 3. Mean
shortest route between pairs of low-lying, inland farms is
usually less than about 50% longer than Euclidean dis-
tance (yellow). Areas where mean shortest route is greater
than 50% longer than Euclidean distance (red and black)
include many rivers and estuaries, the East Anglian Fens,
the Norfolk Broads, moorland, and hill and mountain
ranges. Of particular interest in terms of the UK 2001 epi-
demic are the Solway Firth (Fig. 3, top inset) and the river
Severn (Fig. 3, bottom inset) where infected premises
were observed at the same time during the epidemic on
both sides of these estuaries. In the absence of wind-borne
viral plumes [8], transmission did not occur directly over
these large bodies of water. Models using a Euclidean-dis-
tance based transmission kernel may over-estimate the
number of transmission events across these features;
therefore a shortest route based kernel may be more
appropriate. In Methods we describe a statistical test that
detects if transmission between farms on opposite sides of
a barrier is better modelled by a shortest route based ker-
nel or a Euclidean-distance based one. The Solway Firth
estuary partially separates Cumbria from Dumfries and
Galloway. Many farms were infected on both sides of the
Solway Firth throughout March and April. Because it is so
broad, any transmission between farms on its opposite
sides most probably occurred via road. The p-value for the
test is less than 0.001 (n  = 2429); a highly significant
result suggesting, not unexpectedly, that transmission
between farms on opposite sides of the Solway Firth is
best modelled using a shortest route based transmission
kernel.
The river Severn and its estuary are crossed by the M4/M48
Motorway in the southwest and by the A40 trunk road in
the northeast, which themselves are about 40 km apart
(Fig. 3, bottom inset). The p-value for the test is less than
0.001 (n = 672); a highly significant result suggesting that
Euclidean versus shortest route for non-transmissions (yel- low closed circles), and possible transmissions (black open  circles) for the Devon epidemic after 23rd February 2001 Figure 2
Euclidean versus shortest route for non-transmissions (yel-
low closed circles), and possible transmissions (black open 
circles) for the Devon epidemic after 23rd February 2001.
Table 1: List of regions and the counties used in the analysis.
Region Counties
Devon Devon
Cumbria Cumbria
Dumfries and Galloway Dumfries and Galloway
Welsh Borders Powys, Hereford and Worcester, 
Gloucestershire and Avon
Settle Lancashire and North YorkshireBMC Veterinary Research 2006, 2:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/2/3
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transmission between farms on opposite sides of the Sev-
ern is best modelled using a shortest route based transmis-
sion kernel.
In Fig. 4A we plot the percentage reduction in the case
reproduction ratio (R0) across the river Severn due to its
presence. Close to the river and midway between the A40
and M4 bridge crossings, the reduction in R0 is close to
100%: farms in this area are therefore unlikely to infect
farms on the opposite side of the river. As we move further
away from the river or toward the bridges the reduction in
R0 is less severe, as one would expect. A similar conclusion
naturally applies to the Solway Firth (Fig. 4B).
We have also applied this test to other barriers. For exam-
ple, during the epidemic it was suggested that the M6
Motorway, running north-south through Cumbria – and
therefore through the centre of the Cumbrian epidemic –
may have acted as a barrier to FMDV transmission
between farms adjacent to it (Fig. 3, middle inset). Indeed,
it is illegal for people, livestock and vehicles to directly
cross the M6. We may therefore speculate that infection of
farms across the M6 was exclusively via road. The network
of minor roads that existed before the M6 was built still
exist today – they cross the M6 via numerous tunnels and
bridges. Thus, roads between farms on either side of the
M6 do not show large excursions as observed around the
Severn or the Solway Firth. The p-value of the test for IPs
within 3 km of the M6 is 0.84 (n = 188); a non-significant
result suggesting that a Euclidean-distance based trans-
mission kernel is a sufficient model of transmission
between farms on opposite sides of the M6 Motorway. We
have also tested medium to large inland rivers (Devon: p
= 0.64, n = 296, Cumbria: p = 0.18, n = 11700, Dumfries
and Galloway: p = 0.43,  n = 1180) and railway lines
(Devon: p > 0.999, n = 10, Cumbria: p = 0.056, n = 4310,
Dumfries and Galloway: p = 0.56, n = 351). Thus trans-
mission between farms on opposite sides of these barriers
Table 2: p-values for the test to see if shortest and quickest routes are better predictors of transmission risk than Euclidean distance 
and vice versa for the various regions and different parameter values. p-values below 0.05 are taken to mean a significantly better 
predictor. The default parameter values are latent period (l) equal to 4 days and sheep and cattle transmissibility parameters equal (Tc 
= Ts, only relative values are required), n is the sum of pi,j over all possible transmissions in Equation 1; effectively the number of IPs on 
their day of infection that are within 10 km of an infectious IP.
p-value
Region Parameter Shortest route 
better than Eucl. 
distance
Eucl. distance 
better than 
Shortest route
Quickest route 
better than Eucl. 
distance
Eucl. distance 
better than 
Quickest route
n
Devon l = 3 0.55 0.026 0.91 < 10-3 107
l = 4 0.68 0.029 0.93 < 10-3 104
l = 5 0.61 0.043 0.93 < 10-3 103
Ts/Tc = 10 0.71 0.027 0.92 < 10-3 104
Ts/Tc = 0.1 0.65 0.027 0.92 < 10-3 104
Cumbria l = 3 > 0.999 < 10-3 > 0.999 < 10-3 572
l = 4 0.999 < 10-3 0.999 < 10-3 562
l = 5 0.998 < 10-3 > 0.999 < 10-3 553
Ts/Tc = 10 0.998 < 10-3 0.999 < 10-3 562
Ts/Tc = 0.1 0.998 < 10-3 0.999 < 10-3 565
Dumfries and Galloway l = 3 0.87 0.005 0.93 < 10-3 82
l = 4 0.82 0.006 0.88 < 10-3 78
l = 5 0.82 0.006 0.91 < 10-3 76
Ts/Tc = 10 0.81 0.005 0.90 < 10-3 78
Ts/Tc = 0.1 0.85 0.011 0.87 < 10-3 78
Welsh Borders l = 3 0.87 0.003 0.87 < 10-3 97
l = 4 0.88 0.011 0.87 < 10-3 93
l = 5 0.92 0.011 0.92 < 10-3 88
Ts/Tc = 10 0.88 0.012 0.85 0.001 92
Ts/Tc = 0.1 0.92 0.008 0.93 < 10-3 95
Settle l = 3 0.95 0.001 0.96 < 10-3 87
l = 4 0.92 < 10-3 0.96 < 10-3 84
l = 5 0.90 0.001 0.89 < 10-3 81
Ts/Tc = 10 0.92 < 10-3 0.97 < 10-3 84
Ts/Tc = 0.1 0.91 < 10-3 0.94 < 10-3 84BMC Veterinary Research 2006, 2:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/2/3
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is also best modelled by a Euclidean-distance based kernel
rather than a shortest route based kernel. The p-value for
railway lines in Cumbria is close to significant. However,
given that the other regions are not significant it is reason-
able to assume the same for Cumbria.
Conclusion
Why does Euclidean distance work so well, given that
some transmission was certainly caused by movement of
livestock, people and vehicles between farms via the road
network? We do not have a definitive answer, although
possible explanations include: 1) farms with a common
boundary have more potential routes of infection than
just a main road, for example tracks and private roads that
cross both farms that are not recorded in the Digimap
Meridian™ 2 Database; 2) infection via social networks
may be a significant confounding factor.
In conclusion, Euclidean distance between infectious and
susceptible farms is a better predictor of transmission risk
than shortest or quickest routes, except that is where
major geographical features intervene; then shortest route
is the preferable measure of distance. Thus, mathematical
models of the UK 2001 epidemic were justified in using
Euclidean distance as a risk factor. However, future mod-
els should take into account the many large estuaries
around the UK coastline.
In this paper we have developed a statistical test that can
detect risk associated with various measures of the spatial
relationship between infectious agents over and above
that of simple Euclidean distance. Its use on other eco-
nomically important livestock diseases may help in
understanding their spread in potential future outbreaks.
This work stresses the importance of analysing parallel
geographical and disease outbreak data in order to con-
struct parsimonious models which capture the essence of
disease dynamics and control.
Methods
Premises data
The data used in this paper were taken from the DEFRA
FMD Data archive [9]. Relevant information for the 2,026
mainland IPs were farmhouse coordinates and infection
and slaughter dates. Thirteen IPs in this database that were
confirmed on serology tests for antibodies to the virus do
not have estimated infection dates; we assume that these
IPs were infected 10 days before reporting, which is the
period suggested by DEFRA in the database. Data for all
other livestock holdings in the UK are an amalgam of
2001 census data and DEFRA's list of premises including
all IPs and culled premises from the epidemic; in total
185,791 premises. Relevant information for each
premises was farmhouse coordinates.
Road network
The UK road network was taken from the Digimap Merid-
ian™ 2 Database [10]. In this database, road centre-lines
are represented as links, and road intersections as nodes.
A road link, which connects two nodes, comprises one or
more line segments fixed positionally by a series of con-
nected coordinate points. The coordinate system is the
National Grid with a resolution of 1 m. The database dis-
tinguishes between Motorways, A roads, B roads and
minor roads; it does not include private roads, tracks and
some minor roads and cul-de-sacs of less than 200 m. We
extract from this database the coordinates of all line seg-
ments of all road links. We create our own network of
nodes and links, where each line segment is a link con-
nected to two nodes. A node contains a list of all other
nodes linked to it, and the Euclidean distance to each of
these nodes calculated from the line segment coordinates.
Each farmhouse is then assigned to its nearest node in the
road network, under the assumption that this node is the
closest node to the true farm entrance. The validity of this
assumption was checked by hand for 150 randomly cho-
sen premises in Devon, Wales and Cumbria by compari-
son to Ordnance Survey 1:50000 raster images. Of the 150
premises, 144 (96%) had correctly assigned nodes, the
other 4% were assigned a node within 1 km of their cor-
rect node. Fig. 5 shows true road distances from the 150
farmhouses to their entrance on a road in our network, as
estimated from the raster images, against the Euclidean
distance of the farmhouses to their nearest node in the
network (in general, the nearest node does not corre-
Table 3: As for Table 2 except that only IPs positively confirmed as infected are considered as IPs. IPs with a negative confirmation are 
treated as pre-emptive culls. Parameters are l = 4 and Ts = Tc.
p-value
Region Shortest route better 
than Eucl. distance
Eucl. distance better 
than Shortest route
Quickest route better 
than Eucl. distance
Eucl. distance better 
than Quickest route
n
Devon 0.55 0.19 0.79 0.008 41
Cumbria 0.93 < 10-3 0.998 < 10-3 426
D. and G. 0.25 0.055 0.43 0.005 37
Welsh B. 0.13 0.53 0.18 0.33 14
Settle 0.87 < 10-3 0.90 < 10-3 80BMC Veterinary Research 2006, 2:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/2/3
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UK map of average ratio of shortest route to Euclidean distance for all pairs of livestock farms within 10 km of each other Figure 3
UK map of average ratio of shortest route to Euclidean distance for all pairs of livestock farms within 10 km of each other. 
Averages are taken over 3 × 3 km2 areas. Top inset: Solway Firth, middle inset: M6 Motorway in Cumbria, bottom inset: river 
Severn in Gloucestershire showing the M4/M48 and A40 roads that cross it. Grid lines on insets are spaced every 10 km. Light 
grey areas show infected areas.BMC Veterinary Research 2006, 2:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/2/3
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spond to the position of farm entrance onto a road in our
network). Premises can be categorised into two types:
those with farmhouses adjacent to a road in the network,
which tend to be less than 200 m away from their nearest
node; and farmhouses some distance away from a road,
which show a linear trend with their distance from their
nearest node (these farmhouses are always connected to a
road in our network by a road or track not represented in
the Digimap Meridian™ 2 Database). We assume that
farmhouses less than 200 m away from their nearest node
are 0 m away from a road, and that farmhouses greater
than 200 m away from their nearest node are -60 + 1.03x
metres away from a road (from the linear regression
shown in Fig. 5), where x is the distance to their nearest
node. Any redundant nodes are removed from the net-
work to improve computational efficiency. This com-
prises nodes at dead ends, and nodes that have only two
links (in this case, the nodes linking the redundant node
are linked together and the distance between them is the
sum of the distances between the redundant node and the
two linking nodes). A node assigned to a premises is not
made redundant.
Calculating shortest and quickest routes
We calculate the shortest route between all pairs of live-
stock premises in the UK within 10 km of each other. This
is done by analysing 40 × 40 km2 overlapping regions
incremented by 10 km horizontally or vertically. This
ensures that all farms within 10 km of an IP are linked to
an IP by road. Larger regions are computationally infeasi-
ble.
The road network in a 40 × 40 km2 region is converted
into an N × N matrix where N is the number of nodes in
the region. The matrix is initialised with the road distances
between all linked nodes; elements of nodes not linked
are given infinite values. The Floyd-Warshall algorithm
[11,12] is then applied to this matrix resulting in an N ×
N matrix where the value of each element gives the short-
est route between its corresponding pair of nodes. The
computational running time of the Floyd algorithm scales
as N3, where N varies from approximately 100 to 10,000
depending on the density of roads. When N  exceeds
10,000 the algorithm's running time exceeds 1 day. The
shortest route between any pair of farms is taken as the
shortest route between the two assigned nearest nodes to
these farms plus the assumed road distance of the farms
from the main road. In a very few cases, especially neigh-
bouring farms, the spatial configuration of a pair of farms
and their connecting nodes causes the road distance to be
less than the Euclidean distance. For these rare cases we
assume road distance equal to the Euclidean distance.
To find the quickest route between two farms, distances
between two nodes in the network are replaced with jour-
ney times. We assume that Motorway and trunk road
speeds are 112 kph, A, B and minor road speeds are 72
kph, and farmhouse to road junction speed is 16 kph [13].
Statistical analysis of distance – based risk
Owing to incomplete or equivocal tracing data, it is not
possible to prove conclusively which farm infected which.
Therefore we must consider all infectious IPs as possible
sources of transmission on the particular day a farm gets
infected. However, we can calculate the probabilities of
possible transmission events based on known risk factors.
We know that risk depends on proximity from an infec-
tious IP (K(d)) and on the transmissibility ( ) of the
infecting farm [5]. Thus, we assume that the probability of
an infectious IP i infecting a susceptible farm j (on the day
t when j was infected) is given by

Percentage reduction in R0 across the river Severn (A) and  the Solway Firth (B) due to their presence Figure 4
Percentage reduction in R0 across the river Severn (A) and 
the Solway Firth (B) due to their presence. For every farm i, 
we calculate 1 - ∑j SjK(ri,j)/∑j SjK(ei,j), where j is in the set of all 
farms within 10 km of i and on the opposite side of the estu-
ary to it, Sj is the susceptibility of farm j given by Sj = Ns,j + 
10Nc,j [5] and ei,j is Euclidean distance and ri,j is shortest route. 
These values are Gaussian smoothed over a 5 km radius and 
then averaged. Blue: water, green: no farms.BMC Veterinary Research 2006, 2:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/2/3
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where (t) is the set of all IPs infectious on day t. The
denominator normalises pi,j such that the probability of
farm j being infected on day t is 1. The transmissibilities
, are given by [5]
 = TsNs,i+ TcNc,i,   (2)
where Ts is the transmissibility of sheep, Tc the transmissi-
bility of cattle, Ns,i  the number of sheep and Nc,i  the
number of cattle. Only the relationship between Ts and Tc
is required because of the form of Equation 1. We assume
that the infectious periods of all IPs begin 3, 4 or 5 days
after they become infected and end on the day they are
slaughtered [14-16]; the infection and slaughter dates of
IPs are taken from the DEFRA FMD Data archive [9].
For a given region, defined in Table 1, only farms in those
counties are used in the analysis. For example, for the
Cumbria region we assume that only farms in Cumbria
can infect Cumbrian farms. Farms in the neighbouring
county of Dumfries and Galloway are assumed not to
infect Cumbrian farms. Some pre-emptively culled farms
may have been infected but never reported. Because it is
not possible to say which farms these were or how many
of them there were, we cannot include them as IPs in our
analysis.
For each IP we find the Euclidean distances and the short-
est and the quickest routes between it and all farms it
could have infected after 23rd February 2001 and within
10 km (termed possible transmissions), and all farms it
could not have infected after 23rd February 2001 and
within 10 km (termed non-transmissions). A possible
transmission can occur when an IP is infectious on the day
another farm was infected (and hence became an IP). A
non-transmission between an IP and a farm is defined for
three cases: the IP was infectious before the other farm
became infected, the IP was infectious before the other
farm was pre-emptively culled, and the other farm was
never infected or culled.
The mean shortest or quickest route between infectious
and susceptible premises in a region is found for possible
transmissions (weighted by their probability of occur-
rence p, Equation 1, in which di,j represents Euclidean dis-
tance) and for non-transmissions. The difference between
these means is recorded. The next step is to compare this
difference to a null-distribution. The null hypothesis
states that the difference in the means could have arisen
by chance. The null-distribution is found as follows. One
thousand weighted random samples of possible transmis-
sions are taken from the population of all IP-farm pairs.
The sampling is done without replacement. The weighting
takes into account the fact that the ratio of possible trans-
missions to IP-farm pairs varies with Euclidean distance.
Therefore, the probability of sampling a possible trans-
mission at a given Euclidean distance is conditioned on
this ratio at that distance. If we did not do this, we would
preferentially sample IP-farm pairs with longer Euclidean
distances within the population because these are more
numerous. The unsampled IP-farm pairs make up a ran-
dom sample of non-transmission pairs. The mean short-
est or quickest route of the randomly sampled possible
transmissions and non-transmissions are found and their
difference calculated. The observed difference in the
means is then compared to the null-distribution to obtain
a p-value.
To test if Euclidean distance is a better predictor of risk
than shortest or quickest route, the two variables under
consideration are swapped with di,j in Equation 1 repre-
senting shortest or quickest route.
Simulated epidemics
Epidemics were simulated in order to test the power and
specificity of the statistical test. The simulations are based
on the stochastic simulations done by [5]. Briefly, the
infection of susceptible farms are Poisson processes with
rates determined by the susceptibility of the susceptible
farms, the transmissibility of all infectious farms and a
Euclidean-distance or road based transmission kernel.
The rates and the Euclidean-distance based kernel are
p
Kd
Kd
ij
ij
kj k
= ()
∈ ∑

 
i
k t
()
()
,
,
, ()
1

i
i
True road distances between farmhouses and their entrances  onto a road, taken from Ordnance Survey 1:50000 raster  images, against the Euclidean distances between the farm- houses and their nearest nodes in our road network (circles) Figure 5
True road distances between farmhouses and their entrances 
onto a road, taken from Ordnance Survey 1:50000 raster 
images, against the Euclidean distances between the farm-
houses and their nearest nodes in our road network (cir-
cles). Linear regression through data with Euclidean distance 
to nearest node greater than 200 m gives y = -60 + 1.03x.BMC Veterinary Research 2006, 2:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/2/3
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parameterised using the UK 2001 epidemic [5]. If the
Euclidean-distance based transmission kernel is Ke(e)
(where e is Euclidean distance), and the Euclidean dis-
tance-shortest or quickest route density function of IP-
farm pairs (e.g., Fig. 2) is f(r, e) (where r is shortest or
quickest route), then the shortest or quickest route based
transmission kernel Kr(r), is given by
The Euclidean-distance kernel is the black line in Fig. 1.
Using farms in Devon for f(r,e), the shortest route kernel
is the magenta line and the quickest route kernel is the
green line. For the first 30 days of the simulated epidem-
ics, IPs are slaughtered after 3 days of reporting and farms
within 1.5 km of an IP are pre-emptively culled after 5
days of reporting. These reduce to 1 and 2 days respec-
tively after the first 30 days. There is no dangerous contact
culling. One thousand simulations using the shortest
route based transmission kernel were analysed. For an a
value of 0.05, shortest route was a significantly better pre-
dictor of transmission than Euclidean distance for 98% of
cases. However, the test for Euclidean distance as a better
predictor of transmission was significant in 15% of cases.
Conservatively, therefore, our test has a power of about
85%. An additional 1000 simulations using the Eucli-
dean-distance based kernel were analysed. For an a value
of 0.05, Euclidean distance was a significantly better pre-
dictor of transmission than shortest route for > 99.9% of
cases. However, the test for shortest route as a better pre-
dictor of transmission was significant in just 1% of cases.
Conservatively, therefore, our test has a specificity of
about 99%.
Test for best distance – based transmission kernel
The following statistical test was developed to see if trans-
mission between farms on opposite sides of specific trans-
mission barriers is better modelled using a shortest route
based transmission kernel or a Euclidean-distance based
one. The distribution of infection probabilities (Equation
1) is found for IPs on opposite sides of a barrier first with
di,jrepresenting Euclidean distance. The same is then done
with di,j representing shortest route. If these two infection-
probability distributions are significantly different from
each other, this suggests that transmission across the bar-
rier will be modelled differently under the two kernels.
Given that transmission did not occur directly over the
barrier, this implies that the shortest route based transmis-
sion kernel would be the better model. If, however, the
distributions are not significantly different from each
other, then transmission across the barrier will not be
modelled significantly differently under the two kernels;
therefore we can assume that a simple Euclidean-distance
based transmission kernel will suffice. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test was used to compare the distributions.
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